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Abstract













Social anxiety describes a marked and persistent fear of humiliation and rejection in social situations, often resulting in their avoidance. In the past two decades, innovative models explaining the development and maintenance of the disorder have been proposed, the most prominent of which is Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, which delineates three stages of distorted processing that might be involved in the initiation and maintenance of social fears. Besides the in-situation processing phase and the post-event processing phase, the authors postulate that socially anxious individuals experience considerable anxiety when anticipating a social event. Prior to the event they review in detail what they think might happen. However, this anticipatory processing is supposed to negatively bias their thinking and increase anxiety. Specifically, as socially anxious individuals start to think about the event, they become anxious and their thoughts tend to be dominated by recollections of past failures, negative images of themselves during the event from an observer’s perspective, and by expectations of poor performance and rejection. Sometimes these ruminations lead the socially anxious individual to avoid the event completely. If the individual does take part in the event, he or she is likely to be in a self-focused processing mode, expecting failure, and less likely to notice any signs of being accepted by other people (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
It is important to note that Clark and Wells (1995) described specific maladaptive patterns of anticipatory processing displayed by socially anxious persons whereas other authors have suggested that we all engage in some kind of anticipatory processing (or proactive coping) prior to a stressful event, often with beneficial results (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Schwarzer & Knoll, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2004). Specifically, Vassilopoulos suggested that what differentiates low from high socially anxious individuals is not only the extent to which they engage in anticipatory processing, but also their ability to use the same processing in a more positive and constructive way. For example, low socially anxious individuals may mentally prepare for a stressful situation by recalling past successes and by engaging in plan rehearsal and problem-solving, whereas high socially anxious individuals may recall past failures and engage in stagnant deliberation and catastrophization (Vassilopoulos, 2004, 2005, 2008a).
There is a relative paucity of studies specifically investigating the occurrence and the consequences of such processing. However, the few studies on adults with social anxiety have provided evidence for the relevance of anticipatory processing in this disorder (Brown & Stopa, 2006; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos 2004, 2005, 2008a; Wong & Moulds, 2011). Hinrichsen and Clark’s (2003, Study 1) semi-structured interview, for example, covered a wide range of possible anticipatory processes. As well as being more likely to report recalling past social failures, high socially anxious individuals were also more likely than low socially anxious individuals to (1) dwell on ways of avoiding, or escaping from, the social situation; (2) catastrophize about what might happen in the situation; (3) engage in anticipatory safety behaviours and (4) generate negative, distorted observer-perspective images about how they might appear in the situation. Along similar lines, Vassilopoulos (2004, 2008a) reported that high socially anxious individuals engage in a more prolonged anticipatory processing than low socially anxious individuals. The author also noted that anticipatory processing involves ruminations about the upcoming social event that tend to be recurrent and intrusive, increasing individuals’ anxiety and interfering with concentration (Vassilopoulos, 2004). However, the correlational and retrospective nature of the above studies limits their conclusiveness. It might, for example be the case that individuals with social anxiety experience more distressing events than controls, which might account for their more negative anticipatory processing. Exposing individuals to a standardized social stressor in the laboratory and measuring subsequent anticipatory processing provides a more stringent test of Clark and Wells’ assumptions.
Using this approach, Hinrichsen and Clark (2003, Study 2) exposed high and low socially anxious individuals to an impromptu speech task. Before giving the speech, individuals either engaged in negative anticipatory processing (dwelling on past failures and negative self-images, thinking about what could go wrong in the impeding situation, and visualizing how they think they will appear to others) or performed a distraction task. Engaging in anticipatory processing produced more sustained elevations of anticipatory anxiety and led to higher levels of peak anxiety during the speech, although this effect did not differ significantly between the high and low social anxiety groups, an effect that was later replicated by Wong and Moulds (2011). Vassilopoulos (2005) carried out a similar study and found that, compared to high socially anxious participants engaging in a distraction task, high socially anxious individuals in the anticipatory condition predicted more negative overall appearance and reported more anxiety before a speech task. 
In contrast, Brown and Stopa (2006) asked high and low socially anxious participants to give two speeches, one after no anticipatory processing and one after ten minutes of anticipatory processing. It was found that participants engaged in anticipatory processing actually reported feeling less anxious compared to participants in the distraction condition. However, this result may simply be an artifact of the authors using a non-counterbalanced experimental design, in that all participants engaged in anticipatory processing after they have taken part in the distraction condition. In addition, high and low socially anxious participants in the study reported by Voncken, Rinck, Deckers, and Lange (2012) did not show a significant increase on a measure of state anxiety (STAI-state) after being informed that they have soon to hold a conversation with an unknown person. Finally, it is not clear whether the increase in self-reported anxiety during anticipatory processing observed in previous studies (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005; Wong & Moulds, 2011) was the direct effect of threat induction (i.e., participants being informed that they have to give an impromptu speech to camera) or of the anticipatory processing task (or a combination). Thus the current study attempted to further investigate the effects of anticipatory processing on anxiety by measuring children’s state anxiety at various points during the experiment (before and after threat induction and after the anticipatory processing task).        
All in all, the available evidence from the above adult studies appears to suggest that anticipatory processing (relative to distraction) does indeed have the maladaptive effects described by Clark and Wells (1995). Nevertheless, the evidence is less conclusive regarding the effects of anticipatory processing on self-reported anxiety. In addition, it remains to be seen whether anticipatory processing has similar effects in pre-adolescent samples, for whom the risk for social anxiety is dramatically increased (Miers, Blote, de Rooij, Bokhorst, & Westenberg, 2013). Based on accumulating evidence suggesting that the Clark and Wells model of social anxiety (1995) is also applicable to older children and adolescents (see argument below), one might expect similar results to emerge in children.   
Anticipatory processing in children
Given the relative paucity of sophisticated cognitive models of childhood anxiety disorders, investigators have begun to examine whether disorder-specific cognitive models that have been developed for adults can also be applied to older children and adolescents. In the field of social anxiety, Clark and Wells’ model (1995) has received the most attention so far (Ahrens-Eipper, & Hoyer, 2006; Hodson, McManus, Clark, & Doll, 2008; Schreiber, Höfling, Stangier, Bohn, & Steil, 2012; Vassilopoulos, 2008). Cartwright-Hatton and colleagues (2011) recently reviewed the evidence regarding the developmental appropriateness of adult models at different ages and concluded that - at least for older children and adolescents - these models (the Clark & Wells model included) do appear to be “largely applicable.” However, the authors also observed that “… although adolescents and older children experience some of the same processes as adults when they are anxious…we know little about whether modifying these processes can be done, and if it can, whether this reduces anxiety” (Cartwright-Hatton, Reynolds, & Wilson, 2011, p. 150). 
Do socially anxious children tend to engage in anticipatory processing prior to a stressful social event? Only two studies have examined anticipatory processing in children and whether this aspect of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model can be applied to younger populations, and the available evidence so far appears to support this possibility. For example, Vassilopoulos (2008b) examined anticipatory processing in primary school pupils aged between 10-13 years. It was found that socially anxious students were more likely to report anticipatory processing on the Childhood Anticipatory Processing Questionnaire (CAPQ), developed by the author of this study. The association between anticipatory processing scores and childhood social anxiety remained significant even when depressive symptoms were statistically controlled. Similarly, Hodson et al. (2008) examined pre-event processing in a sample of secondary school students (aged 11-14 years), who were classified as high, medium, and low in social anxiety based on their scores on a childhood social anxiety measure. It was found that the high social anxiety group scored significantly higher on a one-item question measuring pre-event processing compared to the low socially anxious group. However, as indicated above, the correlational and retrospective design and the lack of experimental control over the social situation that this anticipatory processing referred to, limit the conclusiveness of both studies. 
To address this, the current study aimed to experimentally investigate the postulated role of anticipatory processing in sustaining social anxiety in a sample of children aged 10-11 years. Thus, children with naturally varying levels of social anxiety were informed that they have to perform a stressful task in front of the class and that their social skills and reading abilities would be evaluated, during the task, by a teacher. Then, all children reported their current anxiety and half of the participants were instructed to engage in anticipatory processing (i.e., think about their behaviour and performance in the task and other people’s reactions) whereas the other half were given a distraction task to do for an equivalent time. After 6-7 minutes, participants were asked to report their current anxiety levels and thoughts about the impending task, and to predict their specific behaviours and image of themselves as seen by observers. 
Based on the aforementioned Clark and Wells (1995) model, we hypothesized that trait social anxiety would be associated with predictions of (i) more negative personal appearance, and (ii) more catastrophic thoughts about performance on the speech task. In addition, on the basis of previous work with adults demonstrating that anticipatory processing affects self-reported anxiety and performance predictions, and that these effects are more pronounced in high socially anxious individuals (e.g., Hinrichsen et al., 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005), we made three predictions. First, children engaging in anticipatory processing would report more state anxiety and predict a more negative personal appearance and more catastrophic thoughts, relative to children in the distraction condition. Second, the effects of experimental condition would interact with trait social anxiety, such that the anticipatory processing condition would have more pronounced effects on state anxiety and predictions of negative personal appearance and catastrophic thinking for individuals with higher trait levels of social anxiety. Third, it was hypothesized that these relationships would be robust after controlling for depressive symptoms. This is important given that depression has been robustly associated with repetitive, recurrent and prolonged thoughts about one’s concerns (Watkins, 2008). 
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 181 children1 (93 boys and 88 girls) aged 10-11 years, who were recruited from three primary schools in southwest Greece. All three schools were located in urban areas, were similar in size and mainly attended by children from middle to upper-middle income families. Children from the three schools did not differ significantly on any of the baseline study variables (ps > .05). All children were Caucasian, were recruited with the authorised consent of school authorities, and were free to withdraw from the study at any point. Parental consent was also obtained via letter and an opt-out procedure (none refused). 
Measures
Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised (SASC-R; LaGreca & Stone, 1993). The SASC-R is a 22-item scale assessing children’s subjective feelings of social anxiety (and its correlates, such as avoidance and inhibition) in the context of various interpersonal situations. It contains 18 descriptive self-statements (e.g., “I worry that other children don’t like me”) and four filler items reflecting children’s activity preferences (e.g., “I like to play sports”). In the original study using the SASC-R (LaGreca & Stone, 1993), children were asked to rate how true each statement was for him or her on a 5-point Likert-type scale. However, in the present study the 3-point scale (0 = never true, 1 = sometimes true, 2 = always true) was used to make it more straightforward for children. Children were told to “think about your self and decide whether or not the following sentences are true. There are three possible answers for each question: never true, sometimes true, always true.” The SASC-R was translated into Greek by the first author and back-translated by another bilingual psychologist. A panel of experts including two psychologists and a psychiatrist confirmed the SASC-R’s face validity. Satisfactory psychometric properties of the 5-point SASC-R (e.g., internal consistency, discriminant and concordant validity, test–retest reliability) have been demonstrated in numerous elementary school samples (e.g., La Greca, Dandes, Wick, Shaw, & Stone, 1988; La Greca & Stone, 1993). 
Each child’s social anxiety score was obtained by summing across items. In the present sample, total scores ranged from 0 to 31 (M = 11.70, SD = 6.21). The SASC-R showed good internal consistency in the current sample (α = .84).
Children’s Depression Inventory—short form (CDI; Kovacs, 1992). The CDI (short form) is a 10-item questionnaire assessing depressive symptoms in children and adolescents. Each item on the CDI is scored as 1 (absence of symptom), 2 (mild symptom), or 3 (definite symptom). The children were told: “Children have different feelings and ideas. This form lists the feelings and ideas in a group. For each group of three sentences pick one sentence that describes you best for the last two weeks.” Total scores in our sample ranged from 10 to 28 (M = 12.52, SD = 2.74). The CDI was included to control for effects related to depression so that the specific contribution of social anxiety could be examined. We followed the same translation and adjustment procedures for the CDI as for the SASC-R. The CDI had acceptable internal consistency in the current sample (α = .73).
Specific Behaviour and Overall Appearance Checklist. Participants’ negative predictions of their specific behaviours during the reading task were assessed using a Specific Behaviour checklist, on which children rated three positive behaviours (clear voice, relaxed posture, and breathing normally) and ten negative behaviours (sweating, nervous hand movements, hand and knees tremble, went into fits of laughter, extraneous arm and hand movements, sways, face muscles tense, blushing, “deadpan” face, and “wooden” appearance) on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much). We created an index of negative predicted behaviours by summing across items after first reverse-scoring the positive items (α = .79).
Participants also made more global and evaluative predictions of their Overall Appearance during the task by rating (on the same 0–5 scale) two positive states (you are calm and composed, you are confident) and three negative states (you are embarrassed, you are anxious, you are awkward). We created an index of overall (negative) appearance by summing across items after reverse-scoring the positive items (α = .76). The Specific Behaviour and Overall Appearance indices were highly correlated, r = .75, p < .001, and so we calculated z-scores for each index and summed them to create a composite measure of expected negative personal appearance.
The Thoughts Questionnaire (TQ). This questionnaire was designed by the first author to assess participants’ catastrophization (i.e., their tendency to expect the worst possible outcome) regarding their performance during the impending stress task. The questionnaire consisted of 16 items to which participants responded on a six-point scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 5 (very likely) as to how likely it was that each event would occur. Items were designed to examine eight negative (e.g., make a fool of myself, mind go blank) and eight positive events (e.g., all will run smoothly, the teacher will assess my performance favourably) that could happen to them during the reading task (see Appendix A for scale). The negative items were designed to reflect the catastrophic thinking hypothesized by Clark and Wells (1995) to predominate in ruminative thinking in social anxiety (e.g., self-perceptions of anxiety, poor performance and negative evaluation by others). Positive items were included to limit the impact of response sets, and item order was randomized. Cronbach’s alpha for the total scale with reverse-scored positive items (α = .86) indicated excellent internal consistency. 
State Anxiety. Children rated their anxiety at various points during the experiment on an eleven-point scale from 0 (I do not feel anxious at all) to 10 (I feel extremely anxious).  
Induction task materials 
The distraction and anticipatory processing tasks were developed for the purpose of this experiment. In both tasks, participants worked at their own pace for 6-7 min through a list of 13 items. All items were preceded with the words “Think about” except one item in both the anticipatory and induction task which was preceded by the word “Imagine.” Anticipatory processing task items (see Appendix B) were specifically designed to induce participants to engage in repetitive thinking about themselves, how they may perform in the impeding reading task, and possible consequences of their current situation, consistent with conceptualizations of anticipatory processing (Clark & Wells, 1995; Vassilopoulos, 2004). The distraction task contained items such as “three birds on a branch in a tree” and “your daddy’s car.” For both tasks, participants were instructed to read the items slowly and silently to themselves, spend a few moments attending to each item, and repeat this process if they finished the list of items before the experimenter returned.
Procedure
At the initial session, children were first informed that they were participating in a study investigating concentration. They were then taken in small groups from their classroom to a quiet room, where they completed the SASC and the CDI. The tasks were introduced to the children one at a time following the standard protocol. Before the testing began, children were told that they could stop the session at any time if they did not want to carry on. This session lasted approximately 10-15 min. 
The second session took place approximately 2-3 days after the first. Here children were again taken in small groups from their classroom to a separate quiet room. They rated their state anxiety first and then were informed that they would have to perform a task in front of the class. 
“The next part of this study is an assessment of your social skills and reading ability. In a while I am going to ask you to stand up and read an excerpt from a children’s book in front of the class. Also, a teacher, whom you will meet for the first time, will come and watch you reading the book and rate you on several different measures of the effectiveness of your presentation.”
Next, children rated their state anxiety for a second time. Approximately half the participants were then instructed to engage in anticipatory processing whereas the other half of the participants in the control condition were instructed to fully concentrate on the distraction task for the same amount of time. Next, the experimenter left the group to concentrate on the task (although she remained in the room) for 6-7 minutes. After this period, children reported their anxiety again and completed the specific behaviour and overall appearance checklists, and the thoughts questionnaire. Finally, they were asked open-ended questions about the nature of the study and its purpose before being fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results
Preliminary analyses
	Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all study variables, tabulated by experimental condition. Gender composition did not differ significantly between conditions, χ²(1) = 0.01, p = .92. There was a trend for participants in the anticipatory condition to report more trait social anxiety than participants in the distraction condition, t(179) = 1.95, p = .052, but no statistically significant difference emerged for depressive symptoms, t(179) = 0.62, p = .53. Because of the marginally significant difference between conditions on trait social anxiety, and because this variable significantly predicted state anxiety (pre-induction r = .28, post-induction r = .29, post-manipulation r = .34, all ps < .001), overall appearance (r = .45, p < .001) and negative thoughts (r = .40, p < .001), we covaried trait social anxiety in the following analyses.
Effects of threat induction and anticipation manipulation on state anxiety 
	There were three mood measurements during the study: (1) immediately prior to threat induction, (2) immediately after the threat induction, and (3) after the experimental manipulation. To examine changes in anxiety feelings related to threat induction, state anxiety scores were analysed using a repeated measures ANCOVA with repeated contrasts on the repeated-measures time factor (pre-induction vs. post-induction vs. post-manipulation), with condition (anticipation vs. distraction) and gender (male vs. female) as the between-subjects factors and trait social anxiety as a covariate. Adjusting for the effect of trait social anxiety, F(1, 176) = 20.88, p < .001, η²p = .11, there was a significant effect of condition, F(1, 176) = 11.12, p = .001, η²p = .06, but no significant effect of gender, F(1, 176) = 2.66, p = .10, η²p = .01, and no significant condition by gender interaction, F < 1, η²p < .01. 
	For the pre- versus post-induction contrast, there was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 176) = 19.64, p < .001, η²p = .10, qualified by a significant time by gender interaction, F(1, 176) = 10.23, p = .002, η²p = .05. The time by gender interaction indicated that girls, F(1, 86) = 9.48, p = .003, η²p = .10 (M = 1.53 to 4.81), increased more in state anxiety than boys, F(1, 91) = 12.49, p = .001, η²p = .12 (M = 1.70 to 3.60), after the threat induction, although both genders showed significant increases. The time by condition interaction, F(1, 176) = 1.68, p = .20, η²p = .01, the time by trait social anxiety interaction, F(1, 176) = 2.02, p = .16, η²p = .01, and the time by condition by gender interaction, F < 1, η²p < .01, were all non-significant. 
	For the post-induction versus post-manipulation contrast, there was no significant effect of time, F(1, 176) = 2.34, p = .13, η²p = .01, but there was a significant time by condition interaction, F(1, 176) = 58.60, p < .001, η²p = .25. This interaction reflected no significant change in state anxiety in the anticipatory condition, F < 1, η²p < .01, but a significant reduction in the distraction condition, F(1, 96) = 9.96, p = .002, η²p = .09.2 The time by gender interaction, the time by trait social anxiety interaction, and the time by condition by gender interaction were all non-significant, Fs < 1, η²ps < .01. Thus, as expected, the threat induction increased state anxiety in both conditions but subsequent anticipation maintained state anxiety and subsequent distraction reduced it. Although girls showed a greater increase in state anxiety than boys in response to the threat induction, gender did not predict or interact with any other variables and so was not considered further.
Effects of social anxiety and the anticipation manipulation on negative appearance
	To test the hypothesis that children high in social anxiety would predict a more negative personal appearance during the impending task, we conducted a regression analysis with the composite index of negative appearance as the outcome variable. Regression analysis was used so that social anxiety could be investigated as a continuous variable. All continuous variables were centred on their respective means. Trait social anxiety and depression scores were entered together in the first step to control for the correlation between social anxiety and depressive symptoms (see Table 2 for zero-order correlations among the predictor variables). Experimental condition (coded as a dummy variable: 0 = distraction, 1 = anticipation) was entered in the second step to test the prediction that children engaging in anticipatory processing would predict a more negative personal appearance than children who engaged in distraction. The interactions between trait social anxiety and experimental condition and between depressive symptoms and experimental condition were added in the third step to test the hypothesis that experimentally manipulated anticipatory processing would interact with social anxiety (but not depressive symptoms) to predict expectations of a more negative personal appearance. Table 3 summarizes each of the steps of the hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting negative appearance during the subsequent task. 
	In the first step, as expected, trait social anxiety independently predicted the expectation of a more negative appearance during the task, β = .37, t(178) = 5.10, p < .001, as did depressive symptoms, β = .18, t(178) = 2.41, p = .02. After the entry of these two variables, the overall model was significant, F(2, 178) = 26.58, p < .001. 
	In the second step, condition was a significant predictor, β = .27, t(177) = 4.26, p < .001, such that participants in the anticipation condition predicted that they would have a more negative appearance during the reading task than participants in the distraction condition, controlling for trait social anxiety and depressive symptoms. After the entry of condition, the overall model remained significant, F(3, 177) = 25.49, p < .001. 
	Crucially, in the third step, the interaction between trait social anxiety and anticipation manipulation significantly predicted estimations of a more negative appearance, β = .20, t(175) = 2.11, p = .04, whereas the interaction between depressive symptoms and anticipation manipulation did not, β = –.08, t < 1. After the inclusion of both interactions, the overall model remained significant, F(5, 175) = 16.40, p < .001. Figure 1 shows the plot of the significant interaction, which shows that the positive relationship between trait social anxiety and expectation of a negative appearance was greater for participants in the anticipation condition, β = .49, t(80) = 4.83, p < .001, than for participants in the distraction condition, β = .22, t(95) = 2.03, p = .045. Thus, as we predicted, anticipation resulted in the expectation of a more negative appearance during the subsequent task, and this effect was stronger for children with higher trait social anxiety, but did not differ as a function of depressive symptoms.	
	Effects of social anxiety and the anticipation manipulation on catastrophic thoughts about the task
	To test our hypotheses relating to catastrophic thoughts regarding the task, we conducted an equivalent hierarchical regression analysis with catastrophic thoughts as the outcome variable. Table 4 summarizes each of the steps of the hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting catastrophic thoughts about the subsequent task.
	In the first step, as expected, trait social anxiety predicted more catastrophic thoughts, β = .34, t(178) = 4.44, p < .001, but depressive symptoms did not, β = .13, t(178) = 1.69, p = .09. After the entry of these two variables, the overall model was significant, F(2, 178) = 18.17, p < .001. 
	However, condition was not a significant predictor of catastrophic thoughts in the second step, β = .10, t(177) = 1.47, p = .14, although the overall model remained significant, F(3, 177) = 12.92, p < .001. 
	As expected, in the third step, the interaction between trait social anxiety and the anticipation manipulation significantly predicted catastrophic thoughts, β = .26, t(175) = 2.65, p = .009, whereas the interaction between depressive symptoms and the anticipation manipulation did not, β = –.08, t < 1. After the inclusion of the interaction, the overall model remained significant, F(5, 175) = 9.44, p < .001. The plot of the interaction (see Figure 2) reveals that trait social anxiety was associated with catastrophic thoughts in the anticipation condition, β = .51, t(80) = 5.10, p < .001, but not in the distraction condition, β = .15, t(95) = 1.34, p = .18. Thus, socially anxious participants, but not depressed participants, tended to report more catastrophic thoughts in the anticipation condition.	
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study of anticipatory processing and its relationship with predicted appearance, catastrophic thinking and state anxiety in children. The results can be summarised as follows: (i) trait social anxiety was associated with more state anxiety, negative predictions of personal appearance and catastrophic thoughts relating to an impending performance task, (ii) relative to distraction, anticipatory processing maintained state anxiety and was associated with more negative predictions of personal appearance, (iii) experimental condition interacted with social anxiety (but not depressive symptoms) to predict negative appearance estimates and catastrophic thinking relating to the impending performance task. The effect of experimental condition on cognitive bias was stronger for children who were high in social anxiety than for those low in social anxiety. Taken together, these results replicate and extend previous findings by Hodson et al. (2008) and Vassilopoulos (2008b) which mainly relied on retrospective reports. They also offer further support for the notion that anticipatory processing plays a role in maintaining social anxiety in middle childhood. Theoretical and practical implications as well as areas for future research are described below.  
We expected that engaging in anticipatory processing would have a negative effect on children’s predictions about their performance and physical appearance during an impending interpersonal task. The study yielded findings consistent with this suggestion: children predicted more negative appearance during the task when they had previously engaged in anticipation than when they had engaged in distraction. Moreover, trait social anxiety interacted with experimental condition to predict expectations of negative personal appearance and catastrophic thoughts relating to the performance task. These results are broadly consistent with the assumptions of cognitive models of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995), and with the results of empirical studies on high and low socially anxious adults (Vassilopoulos, 2005). 
On the basis of previous findings, we also predicted that engaging in anticipatory processing would maintain anxiety levels, relative to a distraction condition. Consistent with this, participants reported lingering feelings of anxiety after having engaged in anticipatory processing, whereas children who were told to distract showed a marked decrease in state anxiety. These findings are consistent with previous research in adults showing that anticipation results in an increase in (or lack of attenuation of) anxiety, whereas distraction prior to a speech task leads to less anticipatory anxiety (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005; Wong & Moulds, 2011). However, contrary to the results reported by Vassilopoulos (2005) – but in line with the findings reported by both Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) and Wong and Moulds (2011) – the effect of anticipatory processing on state anxiety was not pronounced in participants high in trait social anxiety. 
Finally, cognitive models have postulated that individuals high in social anxiety tend to engage in catastrophic thinking (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995). Consistent with these cognitive models, in the present study we found that childhood social anxiety—independently of experimental condition and depressive symptoms—was associated with more negative estimates of personal appearance and catastrophic thoughts relating to the performance task. This finding is also consistent with relevant evidence from past research, which has shown that socially anxious children and adults tend to catastrophize in response to ambiguous hypothetical events (Stopa & Clark, 2000; Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2008). Clinically speaking, this means that when using cognitive restructuring with socially anxious children, it is important that clinicians focus specifically on helping children to block catastrophic thinking when it occurs and replace it with normal thinking as well as helping them carefully examine all of the evidence before making realistic predictions about social situations. 
One limitation of the current study is that, since children in the current study did not perform a social-evaluative task after the anticipatory processing manipulation, it is not clear whether the maladaptive cognitions and elevated anxiety levels observed (as a result of the manipulation) can influence anxiety and/or behaviour in feared social situations. Interestingly, in Wong and Moulds’ (2011) study, participants were asked to deliver an impromptu speech after having first engaged in an anticipation or distraction task. They found that, for high socially anxious adults, anticipatory processing was indirectly associated with poorer speech performance through its effect on self-reported anxiety. Future studies should examine whether perceived anxiety influences in-situation behaviours and overall performance in children characterized by high levels of social anxiety. Researchers should also complement self-report measures with psychophysiological and behavioural measures. 
A number of further limitations must be noted. First, we employed an analogue non-clinical sample and our results require replication with a clinical sample. Second, we did not have a control condition in which children were not instructed to engage in anticipatory processing or distraction, so it is unclear whether the differential findings between conditions are due to active effects of anticipation, distraction, or both. Third, we only investigated one component of the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model (anticipatory processing), and future studies could explore how other components (e.g., in-situation performance, post-event processing) of this model interact. Fourth, a manipulation check was not included to ensure that participants in the anticipatory processing condition actually had more thoughts about the impending performance task compared to participants in the distraction condition. However, given that all participants worked on their forms for the required time, there is some assurance that children were actually engaged in their respective conditions. Fifth, for the successful identification of social anxiety symptoms, a 3-point Likert scale version of SASC-R was used instead of the original 5-point scale. However, this reduced scale has been used successfully in many studies with Greek participants (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 2008b; Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2008). Finally, although we cannot rule out the role of demand characteristics, no children appear to have correctly guessed the purpose of the experiment when interrogated later. 
Provided that our findings are replicated by future studies, they could have important implications for the treatment of socially anxious children. Specifically, they suggest that anticipatory processing is related to childhood social anxiety, or rather that anticipatory anxiety may causally induce or sustain elevated anxiety levels and social fears before entering a specific social situation. Therefore, anticipatory processing management training and distraction techniques should be considered as treatment components for children suffering from social anxiety disorder. These techniques may reduce anxiety feelings and could be used preventatively in high-risk populations. As anticipatory processing in the current study was inhibited by engaging in a distraction task, resulting in a marked decrease of self-reported state anxiety, it may be sufficient to teach socially anxious children to distract themselves from their problems as an effective way of keeping anxious feeling to a low level. 
Overall, it seems that there were some positive effects of being in the distraction condition compared to the anticipation condition. First, engagement in a distraction task following an anxious mood induction led to attenuation of anxiety. Second, distraction moderated the influence of trait social anxiety on negative predictions of appearance and catastrophic thoughts relating to the subsequent speech task, such that the effects of experimental condition were more pronounced for socially anxious children. Thus, the results of the current study could make an evidence-based clinician feel more confident in recommending distraction as a strategy for socially anxious children who tend to catastrophize before an anxiety-provoking task. Nevertheless, the lack of a follow-up means that it is not known whether the benefits of distraction are maintained over longer time periods. Moreover, it is not clear whether children should continue to distract themselves upon entering the anxiety-provoking situation, as it is then considered as a safety behaviour (Kocovski, MacKenzie, & Rector, 2011) or subtle behavioural avoidance, which may have negative consequences. More research is needed on this point.
Is anticipatory processing specific to social anxiety, or it does take place in other disorders as well? The results of this study clearly suggest that the effects of anticipatory processing are specific to children who are higher in social anxiety and do not generalize to children who are higher in depression. This is hardly surprising given that those who tend towards depression often have a past orientation (i.e. they brood over the misfortunes of the past), whereas anticipatory processing is a future-oriented process. However, it is also likely that anticipatory processing may be of some relevance in others types of anxieties like specific phobias (doctor or dental phobia), generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Vassilopoulos, 2004). The common theme is all these disorders, around which anticipatory processing centres is the perception of imminent threat, danger or catastrophe, which mobilizes the individual to avoid the situation or find ways to effectively deal with it (Vassilopoulos, 2004).    
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1.	Of the original 189 students who participated in both sessions of the study, data from eight participants were dropped due to incomplete data and language difficulties, yielding a total of 181 students. 




















Means (SDs) for Study Variables by Manipulation Condition
	Anticipation (n = 83)	Distraction (n = 98)
Gender	40 girls, 43 boys	48 girls, 50 boys
SASC-R	12.67 (5.95)	10.88 (6.35)
CDI	12.66 (3.01)	12.41 (2.50)
Negative appearance composite	0.66 (1.83)	–0.56 (1.72)
Catastrophic thoughts 	32.63 (15.17)	28.04 (14.38)
Anxiety ratings		
       Time 1 	2.01 (2.65)	1.29 (2.06)
       Time 2	4.33 (3.37)	4.07 (3.26)
       Time 3 	5.10 (3.34)	1.89 (2.65)


















Note. Condition treated as a dummy variable (distraction = 0, anticipation = 1). SASC-R = Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised; CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory. 
























Regression of Expected Negative Appearance on Trait Social Anxiety and Condition
Predictor	B	SE(B)	β	∆R²
Step 1				.23***
     CDI	0.12	0.05	.18*	
     SASC-R	0.11	0.02	.37***	
Step 2				.07***
     CDI	0.12	0.05	.18**	
     SASC-R	0.10	0.02	.33***	
     Condition	1.01	0.24	.27***	
Step 3				.02
     CDI	0.17	0.07	.25*	
     SASC-R	0.06	0.03	.20*	
     Condition	1.00	0.24	.27***	
     Condition x CDI	–0.08	0.10	–.08	
     Condition x SASC-R	0.09	0.04	.20*	
Total R²				.32***
Note. Condition treated as a dummy variable (distraction = 0, anticipation = 1). CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory; SASC-R = Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised. 








Regression of Catastrophic Thoughts on Trait Social Anxiety and Condition
Predictor	B	SE(B)	β	∆R²
Step 1				.17***
     CDI	0.70	0.41	.13	
     SASC-R	0.81	0.18	.34***	
Step 2				.01
     CDI	0.71	0.41	.13	
     SASC-R	0.77	0.18	.32***	
     Condition	3.02	2.05	.10	
Step 3				.03*
     CDI	1.04	0.63	.19	
     SASC-R	0.34	0.25	.14	
     Condition	2.84	2.02	.10	
     Condition x CDI	–0.58	0.82	–.08	
     Condition x SASC-R	0.97	0.37	.26**	
Total R²				.21***
Note. Condition treated as a dummy variable (distraction = 0, anticipation = 1). CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory; SASC-R = Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised. 

































APPENDIX A: THE THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE

Please rate each statement as to how likely you think it is to happen to you during the reading task


P. 	1. I will do well in the task 		0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	2. My mind will go “blank” 		0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	3. I will slur my words		0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	4.  I always fail in this type
	     of situation 			0	1	2	3	4	5	
P.	5. I will feel relaxed			0	1	2	3	4	5
P.	6. I will make a good impression 
	     to the teacher			0	1	2	3	4	5
P. 	7. All will run smoothly		0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	8. I will make a fool of myself	0	1	2	3	4	5
P.	9. My movements will be 
    comfortable				0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	10. I will look stupid			0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	11. I will make a lot of mistakes	0	1	2	3	4	5
P.	12. My voice will be loud and clear	0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	13. My blushing/sweating/dry mouth
	      shaking will be obvious		0	1	2	3	4	5
N.	14. My heart will be pounding fast	0	1	2	3	4	5
P.	15. The teacher will like me		0	1	2	3	4	5
P.	16. The teacher will assess my 
	     performance favourably		0	1	2	3	4	5
	

















APPENDIX B: ANTICIPATORY PROCESSING INDUCTION ITEMS

Think about the way you will feel during the task
Think about how you will appear to others during the task
Think about your specific behaviours during the task
Think about how nervous or relaxed you will be during the task
Think about your posture, your movements, you face expression during the task
Think about what might happen during the task
Think about what might go right or wrong during the task
Think about what your co-students might think of you during the task
Think about what the teacher might think of you during the task
Think about what will happen when you finish the task
Think about what the result of the assessment of your performance will be
Think about the way you will feel after the task is over
Imagine yourself speaking in front of the class
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